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The brain drain and how to reduce it
Traditionally, the central concern in economists'
discussions of the professions in the Third World
has been the 'brain drain'. How many Third
World professionals migrate to industrialised
countries and why? What are the costs and bene-
fits involved in this process and how are they
allocated? Concern with such questions has been
reflected in policy recommendations aimed at re-
ducing the flow or, at least, obtaining some com-
pensation for countries which lose from it.
The best way to reduce the flow has usually
been identified as an improvement in the mone-
tary rewards and working conditions of the pro-
fessionals concerned. This is based on the un-
compromising view that "professional men the
world over have much the same requirements
for job satisfaction and, unless the traditional
cultures and pay scales of many brain-losing
countries (developed and less developed alike) can
adapt to these requirements, then . . . high-level
manpower with get-up-and-go will get up and
go" (Baldwin, 1970:-370). Most national and
international reports on brain drain, if slightly
less forthright, echo such sentiments. Thus the
Colombo Plan (1972: 4), for instance, recom-
mends, among other things, "the reorganisation
of systems of administration to give a proper
place to professionals: factors like salary, service
conditions, working facilities, academic and pro-
fessional environments, etc., weigh heavily in the
locational decisions of skilled manpower." And
the report of the Sri Lanka Cabinet Committee
(1974: 36-49) recommends a review of salaries
for critical groups as part of "a set of general
measures which seek to improve the service con-
ditions of scientific, professional and technical
personnel."
The problem with such recommendations is that
the changes in rewards and working conditions
necessary in order to make much impact on
brain drain are likely to be substantial. Moreover,
it is difficult to withold an improvement in the
rewards of the mobile from other groups of top
salary-earners who can plausibly claim 'compara-
bility' with them. Thus to try to pay international
transfer earnings to the mobile would not only
The Third World Professional and Collective Self-Reliance-
Towards the Barefoot Accountant?
reduce the numbers that could be absorbed: it
would also have a drastic effect on internal in-
come distribution.
In practice governments generally do allow them-
selves to be bullied into paying internationally
mobile professionals rather more than domestic
considerations alone would warrant but not
enough to reduce the incentive to migratewith
the result that they have to resort to emigration
controls and bonding schemes. Controls over the
issue of, for instance, passports and foreign ex-
changeif the capacity to operate them exists-
can obviously be an effective means of preventing
people from leaving a country. But mobile pro-
fessionals retained in these ways are usually so
frustrated and demoralised as to be an obstacle
both to efficiency and to reform. There are many
examples, also, of ingenuity in evading bonds
on the part of those trained at home and of
bond-breaking by those trained abroad.
Living with the brain drain
This array of problems has encouraged several
Third World governments to settle for a strategy
of 'living with the brain drain'. The governments
of the Philippines and South Korea, for instance,
look actively for employment opportunities over-
seas for their skilled, semi-professional and pro-
fessional workers and sign 'export contracts' for
such manpower. And UNCTAD has made cal-
culations (UNCTAD, 1975), which might be used
in negotiations to regularise government-to-
government compensation by brain-gaining to
brain-losing countries, of the transfer to the USA
from the Third World in 1970 represented by
skilled migration. Their estimates (based on losses
and gains of life-time income streams, adjusted
for externalities and for intra-marginal gains or
losses in excess of those indicated by market
wages and salaries) amount to $3,700 million,
$600 million more than US development assist-
ance in the same year. Compensation on such a
scale would obviously make the brain drain
easier to live with.
A scheme that has attracted a lot of recent pub-
licity, and which at first sight looks like an
attempt to reduce the brain drain rather than
to live with it, is the suggested income tax on
'drained' manpower from less developed coun-
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tries (Bhagwati and Dellalfar, 1973). The tax,
which could be progressive or proportional,
would be collected from the immigrants by the
tax authority of the host developed country over
a limited period and eventually handed over
under UN auspices to the government of the
country of origin. This scheme appears to differ
from export contract and government-to-govern-
ment compensation schemes in that it is intended
not merely to raise compensatory revenue but
also to reduce the level of migration. Indeed,
in principle, given a sufficiently high tax rate,
both brain drain and revenue could presumably
be reduced to zero. However, on admittedly pre-
liminary calculations (e.g., see Psacharopoulos,
1975, and De Voretz and Maki, 1975), elasticities
of response seem to be such that tax rates would
have to be punitively high to have more than
a marginal effect on the number of migrants.
In which case the scheme would differ little in
effect from government-to-government compensa-
tion, and one wonders whether it is worth con-
fronting the formidable political, legal and ad-
ministrative problems raised by the scheme (see
Partington 1975, Oldham and Pomp 1975) for
so little return.
To some extent the economic recession of the
last few years has lessened the numerical problem
of migration of Third World professionals. The
rate of expansion in the centre's demand, not
only for resource-based professionals such as
engineers but also for school and university
teachers and possibly even medical graduates,
has been considerably reduced. At the same time
output from North American and British medi-
cal schools has been increasing and is planned
to increase further. On the other hand, new areas
of excess demand for professionals have emerged
in the oil-producing countries, and moves to-
wards liberalisation of EEC licensing regulations,
coinciding with Britain's entry, have increased
the opportunities for movement between and into
the EEC countries. On balance, while profes-
sionals continue to migrate in large numbers, the
boom in South-North movement of the 1960s
and early 1970s is unlikely to be repeated in the
foreseeable future.
The disfunctionality of the transnationally defined
professional
This change in climate, as far as the numbers
migrating are concerned, affords an opportunity
to consider the fundamental problem, of which
brain drain is only a symptom, of the nature of
the professions and of professional training in
and for less developed countries. The model
which has been followed by most non-socialist
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Third World countries has been that of integra-
tion, in a subordinate role, in the international
capitalist economy, in the case of the professions
this integration has been extremely tight. Many
Third World professionals have foreign and/or
internationally recognised qualifications, obtained
either abroad or at home. Even when the stage
of using foreign qualifications in one's own train-
ing institutions has been passed, as it has in most
developing countries, localisation of qualifica-
tions has not meant indigenisation; most Third
World professions, encouraged by the trans-
national professional and educational establish-
ment, take care to ensure that their qualifications
are still internationally recognised. This inter-
national negotiability of qualifications is at the
root of brain drain, yet it is the one thing which
none of the 'solutions' has dared to tackle. Much
more important, the tight integration of Third
World professionals into the international quali-
fications network has grave implications for their
internal effectiveness.
The disfunctionality of the transnationally defined
professional is easiest to detect, and most widely
documented, in the case of the medical profes-
sion. Ozlak and Caputo (1973: 19), for instance,
draw a sharp contrast between the population
characteristics and health problems of the USA
and Latin Americaa contrast which could be
drawn even more sharply between any developed
country and Asia and Africa. A much smaller
proportion of the US population is below the
age of 15 and a much higher proportion above
the age of 45 than is the case in Latin America.
"This single difference", they suggest, "explains
the distinct relative importance of various patho-
logies in each context: a prevalence of degenera-
tive diseases associated with old age in one case,
and those corresponding to infantile, juvenile and
obstetric pathology in the other." The much
higher proportion of the population residing in
rural areas in Latin America than in the USA
means that "the planning of the assignment of
resources destined for preventive medicine and
sanitary care must take into account the utiliza-
tion of unsophisticated techniques." With much
lower birth rates than Latin America, much
higher life expectancy, and much lower infant
mortality rates, Canada and the USA are the
only countries in the American continent "where
infantile diseases do not figure among the five
most common causes of death; where infectious
and parasitic dise.ases are almost unknown as a
cause of death; and where the mortality rates
are between one-third and one-tenth of the cor-
responding indices for Latin America". Thus
diseases affecting a large proportion of Latin
America, such as malnutrition, Chagas disease
and yaws, are almost unknown in the USA,
where also diseases such as diptheria, polio-
myelitis, leprosy, malaria, tetanus, typhoid and
pertussis, still rampant in Latin America, have
been virtually wiped out. All this means that
while it may be going too far to say that a re-
designing of medical curricula and syllabi in the
light of actual Third World health problems
would make developing countries' doctors "dis-
functional for the developed countries" (UN
ECOSOC 1974: 24) it would certainly make them
less useful to developed countries and their quali-
fications less negotiable internationally. More-
over, more would have to be involved than
merely a change of emphasis in the training of
doctors. The much lower level of resources avail-
able in the developing countries, as well as the
difference in the nature of their health problems,
argues for the use on a larger scale of medical
auxiliaries or 'barefoot doctors', much cheaper
to train and to pay than doctors, particularly
in rural community health programmes.
Effective demand, need and collective self-reliance
In the case of other professions the disfunc-
tionality of existing patterns is less obvious but
none the less latent. As in the case of the medical
profession it derives from the distinction between
effective demand and need. The professions as
they stand are quite functional in relation to
effective demand as expressed in the market place,
but would become disfunctional as soon as an
attempt was made to shift to a. system based on
satisfying needs rather than meeting effective de-
mands. As an illustration of this we can consider
the implications of the strategy of collective self-
reliance currently being canvassed as an alterna-
tive to existing strategies of dependent or asso-
ciated development. Oteiza and Sercovic (1976: 4)
have usefully summarised collective self-reliance
as involving "(i) the severance of existing links
of dependency operated through the 'international
system' by the dominant countries; (ii) a full
mobilisation of domestic capabilities and resour-
ces; (iii) the strengthening of linkscollaboration
with other underdeveloped countries; (iv) and
the re-orientation of development efforts in order
to meet the basic social needs of the peopies
involved". Such a programme might be regarded
as a necessary but not sufficient condition for
a transition to socialism or for breaking out of
a subordinate position in the world hierarchy
of accumulation.
The restructuring of society and of income dis-
tribution involved in such a programme would
have a clear impact on the pattern of consumer
demand, of production and of technology. Indus-
trialisation would be based no longer on the
exact reproduction for a narrow high-income
market of the transnational brands of consumer
goods, but on the production of basic consumer
goods for a mass market and of a range of
associated intermediate and capital goods. This
would mean a change in the context in which
production-based professionals would work and
necessarily in the way in which their jobs would
have to be defined and in their self-image. This
would have revolutionary implications for sys-
tems of professional training and qualification,
with the emphasis shifting from producing 'a
professional' (to international specifications) to-
wards the acquisition of task-specific knowledge.
The totality of such knowledge would not neces-
sarily be of a 'lower' standard than the inter-
nationally-defined syllabuses of existing profes-
sional training institutions; it would certainly be
very different; it would change constantly as the
structure of the economy changed; and its rela-
tively modestly rewarded possessors would cer-
tainly not be regarded as 'professionals' by their
international counterparts and potential employ-
ers (and thus, incidentally, brain drain would
cease to be a problem).
Remoulding the professions
Any governments, then, which were seriously in-
volved in a move towards collective self-reliance
would need to embark at an early stage on a
remoulding of their professions. Such a pro-
gramme would have both negative and positive
elements. Negative steps would include: a ban
on the local sitting of foreign professional exami-
nations (such as those of the US Educational
Council for Foreign Medical Graduates) and on
foreign recruitment of local professionals; pres-
sure on rich-country authorities to withdraw
recognition from local qualifications; disaffiliation
from international professional associations,
which see the establishment of a common stan-
dard and reciprocal recognition of national quali-
fications as one of their aims; the discouragement
by means of scholarships policy and foreign ex-
change and passport controls, of disfunctional
overseas study; and, in the case of countries
which are over-producing professionals in res-
ponse to excess demand in the international mar-
ket, a restriction in this output to the number
that can be absorbed at home.
This range of negative policy measures, amoun-
ting in effect to a drawing back from tight inte-
gration in the international market and system
of professional qualification, would have to be
combined with a number of positive measures.
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The redefinition of job content along the lines
already suggested and the associated changes
in training would need careful study. They would
also have institutional implications. Among other
things, new Third World centres of training
would need to be developed on a regional basis
to impart those skills which are too specialised
and/or needed in too small quantities to be worth
providing training for at home. This does not
mean that study in a rich country would be
ruled out, but it would be study for the acquisi-
tion of skills and ideas not available at home
and not for the acquisition of the status of inter-
nationally mobile professional. The whole pro-
gramme would not only be essential to the suc-
cess of a strategy of collective self-reliance; it
could only work as part of such a strategy. The
'negative' measures would be much more effec-
tively implemented by a group of countries than
by a single country acting in isolation. The search
for more relevant curricula and syllabuses and
for new locations, institutions and modes of
training implies an even greater degree of co-
operation. Geographical proximity and the use
of a common language would obviously be useful
to the strategy as a whole, but the sharing of a
common aim and political philosophy would be
even more important.
There is no suggestion in all this that collective
self-reliance is just around the corner. Our con-
cern has not been with the feasibility of the
strategy but with its logical implicationsin par-
ticular, its implications for the professions. In-
deed the fact that it implies a drastic remoulding
of the professions could be said to constitute an
important potential obstacle to its implementa-
tion. Members of the professions affected can
hardly be expected to welcome a redefinition
of their role. The ferocity with which the inter-
national medical profession opposes its dilution
by barefoot doctors and the like has to be seen
to be believed. How much more so if analogous
reforms are suggested for the engineering, sur-
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